1.   Jewish Law requires in principle, as part of the divorce (get) procedure, the voluntary participation of both husband and wife: divorce in Jewish law is an act of the parties, authorised by the religious court (Bet Din), not an act of the court itself. It is particularly difficult to effect a divorce where the husband refuses to participate: the wife is then termed "agunah" ("chained"), and is unable to enter into a subsequent religious marriage during the lifetime of the husband refusing her a divorce. If she obtains a civil divorce, and remarries civilly, that latter marriage is not recognised by Jewish religious law (Halakhah); indeed, that subsequent union is regarded as adulterous, and involves substantial disabilities in religious law for any children (who have the status of " mamzerim ").

2.   Over the centuries, halakhic authorities have attempted to grapple with this problem. Three broad approaches may be distinguished: (a) the use of conditions in the marriage contract or other pre-marital agreement, (b) coercion (sometimes, physical) of the husband by the Bet Din, (c) annulment of the marriage by the Bet Din. Against each of these approaches, however, substantial objections have been raised on halakhic grounds. Nevertheless, each one has its own particular history, including periods and Jewish communities within which it was more favoured than at other times and places. These - and other - approaches continue to be discussed by contemporary halakhic authorities, but none of them commands a consensus. For the great majority of orthodox Jewish women refused a get, the difficulties persist, and often require negotiations involving a financial settlement in order to be resolved. At the end of the day, the husband may refuse both blandishments and pressure, and the woman remains "chained". Despite the progress which has been made by the deployment of a variety of measures, involving both civil and religious law, there is as yet no acceptance of any "global" solution, one with a capacity to prevent the problem from arising at all.

3.  This situation results primarily from uncertainties within the very authority structure of the Halakhah. Traditionally, matters of halakhic dispute are resolved by majority decision, but this is difficult to implement in the absence of a supreme authoritative body (comparable to the ancient Sanhedrin) with a defined membership within which a majority may be ascertained (though Maimonides applied the principle to a majority of "communities"). That is one reason why, today, we hear much of "consensus" rather than majority decision. However, both the historical roots and normative status of "consensus" call for further investigation, as does the relationship of consensus to the distinction between halakhah and ma'aseh (practice). There is a tradition in Jewish law according to which some institutions, though accepted by halakhic theory, are not implemented in halakhic practice. In the fourteenth century, for example, Ribash (Resp. 399) was asked to authorise a communal enactment which would have annulled any purported marriage enter into without the presence of a minyan (10 adult males) and of the communal officials. He accepted that such a communal enactment was valid according to the Halakhah, but refused to give his authority to it as a matter practice, in the absence of the agreement of "all the halakhic authorities of the region concerned".

4.  This is not the only issue within the authority structure of Jewish law which calls for further investigation, from halakhic, historical and jurisprudential points of view. Other such issues include (a) the status of arguments based upon the talmudic text in the light of later manuscript evidence suggesting the existence of other versions of that text; (b) the operation of the principle of hilkheta kebatra'i ("the law is in accordance with the later generations") where earlier traditions have fallen into neglect; (c) the availability of "emergency powers". The investigation of such issues requires more than a secular "legal" approach. At many points, they raise the very question of the religious character of the Halakhah, and the status of its authorities. The use of legal approaches is not sufficient. The Halakhah cannot be separated from its theological roots; there is a need to take account also of what I have called the "jurisprudence of revelation".

5.  There are also general issues of both the character of Jewish religious marriage and gender equality within it, which call for further investigation. In different periods of Jewish history, different conceptions of gender equivalence (if not equality) may be discerned: in the context of divorce, one approach is to allow both parties an equivalent right to divorce the other unilaterally (without proving an accepted "cause"); another is to make divorce by consent the norm, thereby prohibiting both parties from effecting a unilateral divorce. It has been argued that such different approaches reflect underlying differences in the very conception of marriage, and that these very differences may be related to the particular cultural environments in which they developed. If that is the case, it prompts further reflection upon the character of Jewish marriage today, and its implications for divorce law.

6.  For a more detailed account of the project, click here.